| 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town) |
and Services des espaces verts
Ltée/Chemlawn
v.
and
Québec Inc. and World Wildlife
Fund Canada, Toronto
Environmental Alliance, Sierra Club of Canada,
Canadian
Environmental Law Association, Parents' Environmental
Network, Healthy Lawns -- Healthy People, Pesticide Action
Group Kitchener, Working Group on the Health Dangers of the
Urban Use of Pesticides, Environmental Action Barrie, Breast
Cancer Prevention Coalition, Vaughan Environmental Action
Committee and Dr. Merryl Hammond, and Fédération
interdisciplinaire de l'horticulture ornementale du
Québec
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR QUEBEC
The appellants are landscaping and lawn care companies operating mostly in the greater Montreal area, with both commercial and residential clients. They make regular use of pesticides approved by the federal Pest Control Products Act in the course of their business activities and hold the requisite licences under Quebec's Pesticides Act. In 1991 the respondent Town, located west of Montreal, adopted By-law 270, which restricted the use of pesticides within its perimeter to specified locations and for enumerated activities. The definition of pesticides in By-law 270 replicates that in the Pesticides Act. Under s. 410(1) of the Quebec Cities and Towns Act ("C.T.A."), the council may make by-laws to "secure peace, order, good government, health and general welfare in the territory of the municipality", while under s. 412(32) C.T.A. it may make by-laws to "regulate or prohibit the . . . use of . . . combustible, explosive, corrosive, toxic, radioactive or other materials that are harmful to public health or safety, in the territory of the municipality or within l km therefrom". In 1992 the appellants were charged with having used pesticides in violation of By-law 270. They brought a motion for declaratory judgment asking the Superior Court to declare By-law 270 to be inoperative and ultra vires the Town's authority. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeal affirmed that decision.
Held: The appeal should be dismissed.
Per L'Heureux-Dubé, Gonthier, Bastarache and Arbour JJ.: As statutory bodies, municipalities may exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those powers necessarily or fairly implied by the expressed power in the statute, and those indispensable powers essential and not merely convenient to the effectuation of the purposes of the corporation. Included in this authority are "general welfare" powers, conferred by provisions in provincial enabling legislation, on which municipalities can draw. Section 410 C.T.A. is an example of such a general welfare provision and supplements the specific grants of power in s. 412. While enabling provisions that allow municipalities to regulate for the "general welfare" within their territory authorize the enactment of by-laws genuinely aimed at furthering goals such as public health and safety, courts faced with an impugned by-law enacted under an "omnibus" provision such as s. 410 C.T.A. must be vigilant in scrutinizing the true purpose of the by-law.
By-law 270 does not fall within the ambit of s. 412(32) C.T.A. There is no equation of pesticides and "toxic . . . materials" either in the terms of the by-law or in any evidence presented during this litigation. Since there is no specific provision in the provincial enabling legislation referring to pesticides, the by-law must fall within the purview of s. 410(1) C.T.A. By-law 270 read as a whole does not impose a total prohibition, but rather permits the use of pesticides in certain situations where that use is not purely an aesthetic pursuit. Based on the distinction between essential and non-essential uses of pesticides, it is reasonable to conclude that the Town by-law's purpose is to minimize the use of allegedly harmful pesticides in order to promote the health of its inhabitants. This purpose falls squarely within the "health" component of s. 410(1) C.T.A. The distinctions impugned by the appellants as restricting their businesses are necessary incidents to the power delegated by the province under s. 410(1) C.T.A. Moreover, reading s. 410(1) to permit the Town to regulate pesticide use is consistent with principles of international law and policy. The interpretation of By-law 270 set out here respects international law's "precautionary principle". In the context of the precautionary principle's tenets, the Town's concerns about pesticides fit well under their rubric of preventive action.
By-law 270 was not rendered inoperative because of a conflict with federal or provincial legislation. As a product of provincial enabling legislation, By-law 270 is subject to the "impossibility of dual compliance" test for conflict between federal and provincial legislation set out in Multiple Access. The federal Pest Control Products Act regulates which pesticides can be registered for manufacture and/or use in Canada. This legislation is permissive, rather than exhaustive, and there is no operational conflict with By-law 270. The Multiple Access test also applies to the inquiry into whether there is a conflict between the by-law and provincial legislation. In this case, there is no barrier to dual compliance with By-law 270 and the Quebec Pesticides Act, nor any plausible evidence that the legislature intended to preclude municipal regulation of pesticide use. The Pesticides Act establishes a permit and licensing system for vendors and commercial applicators of pesticides and thus complements the federal legislation's focus on the products themselves. Along with By-law 270, these laws establish a tri-level regulatory regime.
Per Iacobucci, Major and
LeBel JJ.: The basic test to determine whether there is an
operational conflict remains the impossibility of dual compliance. From this
perspective, the alleged conflict with federal legislation simply does not
exist. Nor does a conflict exist with the Quebec Pesticides Act, for the
reasons given by the majority.
The issues in this case remain strictly first
whether the C.T.A. authorizes municipalities to regulate the use of
pesticides within their territorial limits, and second whether the particular
regulation conforms with the general principles applicable to delegated
legislation. The Town concedes that the only provision under which its by-law
can be upheld is the general clause of s. 410(1) C.T.A. While it appears
to be sound legislative and administrative policy, under general welfare
provisions, to grant local governments a residual authority to address emerging
or changing issues concerning the welfare of the local community living within
their territory, it is not enough that a particular issue has become a pressing
concern in the opinion of a local community. This concern must be closely
related to the immediate interests of the community within the territorial
limits defined by the legislature in a matter where local governments may
usefully intervene. In this case, the by-law targets problems of use of land and
property, and addresses neighborhood concerns that have always been within the
realm of local government activity. The by-law was thus properly authorized by
s. 410(1).
Two basic and longstanding principles of delegated legislation state that a by-law may not be prohibitory and may not discriminate unless the enabling legislation so authorizes. While on its face, By-law 270 involves a general prohibition and then authorizes some specific uses, when it is read as a whole its overall effect is to prohibit purely aesthetic use of pesticides while allowing other uses, mainly for business or agricultural purposes. Moreover, although the by-law discriminates, there can be no regulation on such a topic without some form of discrimination in the sense that the by-law must determine where, when and how a particular product may be used. An implied authority to discriminate was thus unavoidably part of the delegated regulatory power.
Cases Cited
By L'Heureux-Dubé J.
Distinguished: R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674; Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231; applied: Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161; referred to: Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031; Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213; R. v. Sharma, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 650; Re Weir and The Queen (1979), 26 O.R. (2d) 326; Kuchma v. Rural Municipality of Tache, [1945] S.C.R. 234; City of Montréal v. Arcade Amusements Inc., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 368; Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, 2000 SCC 13; Scarborough v. R.E.F. Homes Ltd. (1979), 9 M.P.L.R. 255; Allard Contractors Ltd. v. Coquitlam (District), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 371; Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817; A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Nayudu, 1999 S.O.L. Case No. 53; Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India, [1996] Supp. 5 S.C.R. 241; M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961; Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121; Attorney General for Ontario v. City of Mississauga (1981), 15 M.P.L.R. 212; Township of Uxbridge v. Timber Brothers Sand & Gravel Ltd. (1975), 7 O.R. (2d) 484; British Columbia Lottery Corp. v. City of Vancouver (1999), 169 D.L.R. (4th) 141; Law Society of Upper Canada v. City of Barrie (2000), 46 O.R. (3d) 620; Huot v. Ville de Saint-Jérôme, J.E. 93-1052; Municipalité de Saint-Michel-Archange v. 2419-6388 Québec Inc., [1992] R.J.Q. 875.
By LeBel J.
Applied: Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161; referred to: M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961; Public School Boards' Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 409, 2000 SCC 45; Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470, 2001 SCC 15; City of Montréal v. Arcade Amusements Inc., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 368; R. v. Sharma, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 650; Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, 2000 SCC 13; R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674; Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231.
Statutes and Regulations Cited
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33, s. 2(1)(a).
Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q., c. C-19, ss. 410 [am. 1982, c. 64, s. 5; am. 1996, c. 2, s. 150], 412(32) [am. 1974, c. 45, s. 7; am. 1979, c. 36, s. 83; am. 1981, c. 7, s. 536; am. 1986, c. 91, s. 655; am. 1990, c. 4, s. 177; am. 1992, c. 61, s. 126; am. 1996, c. 2, s. 210; am. 1996, c. 27, s. 17; am. 1999, c. 40, s. 51], 463.1 [ad. 1998, c. 31, s. 15].
Cities, Towns and Villages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, c. C-8, ss. 54, 102.
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, art. 453.
Endangered Species Act, S.N.S. 1998, c. 11, ss. 2(1)(h), 11(1).
Local Government Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 323, s. 249.
Municipal Act, S.M. 1996, c. 58, C.C.S.M. c. M225, ss. 232, 233.
Municipal Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M-45, s. 102.
Municipal Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 119, s. 271.
Municipal Government Act, S.A. 1994, c. M-26.1, ss. 3(c), 7.
Municipal Government Act, S.N.S. 1998, c. 18, ss. 170, 171.
Municipalities Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. M-22, s. 190(2), First Schedule.
Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31, Preamble (para. 6).
Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9, ss. 4(1), (3), 6(1)(j) [am. 1993, c. 44, s. 200].
Pest Control Products Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 1253, s. 45.
Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3, ss. 1 [am. 1987, c. 29, s. 1; am. 1993, c. 77, s. 1], 102 [am. 1987, c. 29, s. 102; am. 1990, c. 85, s. 122; repl. 1993, c. 77, s. 9], 105 [am. 1987, c. 29, s. 105], 105.1 [ad. 1993, c. 77, s. 11], 106 [am. 1987, c. 29, s. 106], 107 [am. 1987, c. 29, s. 107].
Town of Hudson By-Law 248.
Town of Hudson By-Law 270 [am. 1995, by-law 327; am. 1996, by-law 341], arts. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10.
Authors Cited
Cameron, James, and Juli Abouchar. "The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law", in David Freestone and Ellen Hey, eds., The Precautionary Principle and International Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996.
Canada. CEPA Issue Elaboration Paper No. 18 - CEPA and the Precautionary Principle/Approach. Paper prepared by Dr. David VanderZwaag, Director of Marine and Environmental Law Program (MELP), Dalhousie Law School. Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1995.
Côté, Pierre-André. The Interpretation of Legislation in Canada, 3rd ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2000.
Duplessis, Yvon, et Jean Hétu. Les pouvoirs des municipalités en matière de protection de l'environnement, 2e éd. Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1994.
Dussault, René, and Louis Borgeat. Administrative Law: A Treatise, vol. 1, 2nd ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1985.
Freestone, David, and Ellen Hey, eds. The Precautionary Principle and International Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996.
Garant, Patrice. Droit administratif, vol. 1, 4e éd. Cowansville: Yvon Blais, 1996.
Hétu, Jean, Yvon Duplessis, et Dennis Pakenham. Droit Municipal : Principes généraux et contentieux. Montréal: Hébert Denault, 1998.
Hoehn, Felix. Municipalities and Canadian Law: Defining the Authority of Local Governments. Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 1996.
Hogg, Peter W. Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 1, loose-leaf
ed. Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1997 (updated 2000, release 1).
Makuch,
Stanley M. Canadian Municipal and Planning Law. Toronto: Carswell,
1983.
McIntyre, Owen, and Thomas Mosedale. "The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law" (1997), 9 J. Env. L. 221.
Rogers, Ian MacFee. The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, Cum. Supp. to vol. 1, 2nd ed. Toronto: Carswell, 1971 (loose-leaf updated 2001, release 1).
Sullivan, Ruth. Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd ed. Toronto: Butterworths, 1994.
Swaigen, John. "The Hudson Case: Municipal Powers to Regulate Pesticides Confirmed by Quebec Courts" (2000), 34 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 162.
World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal, [1998] Q.J. No. 2546 (QL), J.E. 98-1855, affirming a decision of the Superior Court dismissing the appellants' motion for declaratory judgment. Appeal dismissed.
Gérard Dugré and Denis Manzo, for the appellants
Stéphane Brière and Pierre Lepage, for the respondent.
Stewart A. G. Elgie and Jerry V. DeMarco, for the interveners Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Nature-Action Québec Inc. and World Wildlife Fund Canada.
Theresa A. McClenaghan and Paul Muldoon, for the interveners Toronto Environmental Alliance, Sierra Club of Canada, Canadian Environmental Law Association, Parents' Environmental Network, Healthy Lawns -- Healthy People, Pesticide Action Group Kitchener, Working Group on the Health Dangers of the Urban Use of Pesticides, Environmental Action Barrie, Breast Cancer Prevention Coalition, Vaughan Environmental Action Committee and Dr. Merryl Hammond.
Jean Piette, for the intervener Fédération interdisciplinaire de l'horticulture ornementale du Québec.
Solicitors for the appellants: Fraser Milner Casgrain, Montréal.
Solicitors for the respondent: Bélanger Sauvé, Montréal.
Solicitors for the interveners Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Nature-Action Québec Inc. and World Wildlife Fund Canada: Sierra Legal Defence Fund, Toronto.
Solicitors for the interveners Toronto Environmental Alliance, Sierra Club of Canada, Canadian Environmental Law Association, Parents' Environmental Network, Healthy Lawns -- Healthy People, Pesticide Action Group Kitchener, Working Group on the Health Dangers of the Urban Use of Pesticides, Environmental Action Barrie, Breast Cancer Prevention Coalition, Vaughan Environmental Action Committee and Dr. Merryl Hammond: Canadian Environmental Law Association, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener Fédération interdisciplinaire de l'horticulture ornementale du Québec ("FIHOQ"): Ogilvy Renault, Québec.
CITATION
Before publication in the
S.C.R., this judgment should be cited using the neutral citation:
114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson
(Town), 2001 SCC 40. Once the judgment is published in the S.C.R., the
neutral citation should be used as a parallel citation: 114957 Canada Ltée
(Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] x S.C.R. xxx, 2001
SCC 40.
L'HEUREUX-DUBÉ J.--
1 The context of this appeal includes the realization that our common future, that of every Canadian community, depends on a healthy environment. In the words of the Superior Court judge: "Twenty years ago there was very little concern over the effect of chemicals such as pesticides on the population. Today, we are more conscious of what type of an environment we wish to live in and what quality of life we wish to expose our children [to]." This Court has recognized that "[e]veryone is aware that individually and collectively, we are responsible for preserving the natural environment .... environmental protection [has] emerged as a fundamental value in Canadian society": Ontario v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1031, at para. 55. See also Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, at pp. 16-17.
3 The case arises in an era in which matters of governance are often examined through the lens of the principle of subsidiarity. This is the proposition that law-making and implementation are often best achieved at a level of government that is not only effective, but also closest to the citizens affected and thus most responsive to their needs, to local distinctiveness, and to population diversity. La Forest J. wrote for the majority in R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213, at p. 296, that "the protection of the environment is a major challenge of our time. It is an international problem, one that requires action by governments at all levels" (emphasis added). His reasons in that case also quoted with approval a passage from Our Common Future, the report produced in 1987 by the United Nations' World Commission on the Environment and Development. The so-called "Brundtland Commission" recommended that "local governments [should be] empowered to exceed, but not to lower, national norms" (p. 220).
I. Facts
II. Relevant Statutory Provisions
1. The following words and expressions, whenever the same occur in this By-Law, shall have the following meaning:
a) "PESTICIDES": means any substance, matter or micro-organism intended to control, destroy, reduce, attract or repel, directly or indirectly, an organism which is noxious, harmful or annoying for a human being, fauna, vegetation, crops or other goods or intended to regulate the growth of vegetation, excluding medicine or vaccine;
b) "FARMER": means a farm producer
within the meaning of the Farm Producers Act (R.S.Q., chap., P-28);
. . .
2. The spreading and use of a pesticide is prohibited throughout the territory of the Town.
3. Notwithstanding article 2, it is permitted to use a pesticide in the following cases:
a) in a public or private swimming pool;
b) to purify water intended for the use of human beings or animals;
c) inside of a building;
d) to control or destroy animals which constitute a danger for human beings;
e) to control or destroy plants which constitute a danger for human beings who are allergic thereto.
4. Notwithstanding article 2, a farmer using a pesticide on an immoveable which is exploited for purposes of agriculture or horticulture, in a hot house or in the open, is requested to
a) register, by written declaration, with the Town, in the month of March of each year, the products which he stores and which he will be using during that year.
b) also provide, in the written declaration at article 4 a), the schedule of application of said products and the area(s) of his property where the products will be applied.
5. Notwithstanding
article 2, it is permitted to use a pesticide on a golf course, for a
period not exceeding five (5) years from the date this by-law comes into force:
. . .
6. Notwithstanding
article 2, it is permitted to use a biological pesticide to control or
destroy insects which constitute a danger or an inconvenience for human beings.
. . .
10. For the purpose of article 8 of the Agricultural Abuses Act (R.S.Q. chap. A-2), an inspector designated by the Town may use a pesticide, notwithstanding article 2 of the By-Law, if there is no other efficient way of destroying noxious plants determined as such by the Provincial Government and the presence of which is harmful to a real and continuous agricultural exploitation.
Cities and Towns Act, R.S.Q., c. C-19
410. The council may make by-laws:
(1) To secure peace, order, good
government, health and general welfare in the territory of the municipality,
provided such by-laws are not contrary to the laws of Canada, or of Québec, nor
inconsistent with any special provision of this Act or of the charter;
...
In no case may the council make by-laws
on the matters contemplated in the Agricultural Products, Marine Products and
Food Act (chapter P-29) or in the Dairy Products and Dairy Products Substitutes
Act (chapter P-30). This paragraph applies notwithstanding any provision of a
special Act granting powers on those matters to any municipality other than
Ville de Trois-Rivières and Ville de Sherbrooke.
412. The council may make by-laws:
(32) To regulate or prohibit the storage and use of gun-powder, dry pitch, resin, coal oil, benzine, naphtha, gasoline, turpentine, gun-cotton, nitro-glycerine, and other combustible, explosive, corrosive, toxic or radioactive or other materials that are harmful to public health or safety, in the territory of the municipality or within 1_km therefrom;
By-laws passed under the first paragraph in respect of corrosive, toxic or radioactive materials require the approval of the Minister of the Environment;
463.1 Subject to the Pesticides Act (chapter P-9.3) and the Environment Quality Act (chapter Q-2), the municipality may, with the consent of the owner of an immovable, carry out pesticide application works on the immovable.
Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3
102. The provisions of the Pesticide Management Code and of the other regulations of this Act prevail over any inconsistent provision of any by-law passed by a municipality or an urban community.
102. [as revised in 1993; not yet in force] The
Pesticide Management Code and any other regulation enacted pursuant to this Act
shall render inoperative any regulatory provision concerning the same matter
enacted by a municipality or an urban community, except where the provision
- concerns landscaping or extermination activities, such as fumigation, as
defined by government regulation, and
- prevents or further mitigates harmful effects on the health of humans or of other living species or damage to the environment or to property.
105. [Not yet in force] The Government shall enact by regulation a Pesticide Management Code which may prescribe rules, restrictions or prohibitions respecting activities related to the distribution, storage, transportation, sale or use of any pesticide, pesticide container or any equipment used for any of those activities.
105.1. [Not yet in force] The Pesticide Management Code may require a person who stores pesticides of a determined category or in a determined quantity to subscribe civil liability insurance, the kind, extent, duration, amount and other applicable conditions of which are determined in the said Code, and to furnish thereof to the Minister.
106. [Not yet in force] The Pesticide Management Code may cause any rule elaborated by another government or by a body to be mandatory.
In addition, the code may cause any instructions of the manufacturer of a pesticide or of equipment used for any activity referred to in the code to be mandatory.
107. [Not yet in force] The Government may prescribe that the contravention of the provisions of this code which it determines constitutes an offence.
Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9
4. (1) No person shall manufacture, store, display, distribute or use any control product under unsafe conditions.
...
(3) A control product that is not manufactured, stored, displayed, distributed or used as prescribed or that is manufactured, stored, displayed, distributed or used contrary to the regulations shall be deemed to be manufactured, stored, displayed, distributed or used contrary to subsection (1).
6. (1) The Governor in Council may make
regulations
...
(j) respecting the manufacture, storage,
distribution, display and use of any control product;
Pest Control Products Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1253
45. (1) No person shall use a control product in a manner that is inconsistent with the directions or limitations respecting its use shown on the label.
(2) No person shall use a control product imported for the importer's own use in a manner that is inconsistent with the conditions set forth on the importer's declaration respecting the control product.
(3) No person shall use a control product that is exempt from registration under paragraph 5(a) for any purpose other than the manufacture of a registered control product.
III. Judgments
A. Superior Court
B. Court of Appeal, [1998] Q.J. No. 2546 (QL)
IV. Issues
17 There are two issues raised by this appeal:
(1) Did the Town have the statutory authority to enact By-law 270?
(2) Even if the Town had authority to enact it, was By-law 270 rendered inoperative because of a conflict with federal or provincial legislation?
V. Analysis
A. Did the Town have the statutory authority to enact By-law 270?
18 In R. v. Sharma, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 650, at p. 668, this Court recognized "the principle that, as statutory bodies, municipalities `may exercise only those powers expressly conferred by statute, those powers necessarily or fairly implied by the expressed power in the statute, and those indispensable powers essential and not merely convenient to the effectuation of the purposes of the corporation' (Makuch, Canadian Municipal and Planning Law (1983), at p. 115)." Included in this authority are "general welfare" powers, conferred by provisions in provincial enabling legislation, on which municipalities can draw. As I. M. Rogers points out, "the legislature cannot possibly foresee all the powers that are necessary to the statutory equipment of its creatures.... Undoubtedly the inclusion of `general welfare' provisions was intended to circumvent, to some extent, the effect of the doctrine of ultra vires which puts the municipalities in the position of having to point to an express grant of authority to justify each corporate act" (The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), Cum Supp. to vol. 1, at p. 367).
As a result, since there is no specific provision in the provincial enabling legislation referring to pesticides, the by-law must fall within the purview of s. 410(1) C.T.A. The party challenging a by-law's validity bears the burden of proving that it is ultra vires: see Kuchma v. Rural Municipality of Tache, [1945] S.C.R. 234, at p. 239, and City of Montréal v. Arcade Amusements Inc., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 368, at p. 395.
22 The conclusion that By-law 270 does not fall within the purview of s. 412(32) C.T.A. distinguishes this appeal from R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674. In that case, various express provisions of the provincial enabling legislation at issue covered the regulation of Toronto sidewalks. The appellant was therefore trying to expand the ambit of these specific authorizations by recourse to the "omnibus" provision in Ontario's Municipal Act. Moreover, that provision, s. 102, stated that "[e]very council may pass such by-laws and make such regulations for the health, safety, morality and welfare of the inhabitants of the municipality in matters not specifically provided for by this Act as may be deemed expedient and are not contrary to law..." (emphasis added). The Court thus held in Greenbaum, at p. 693, that "[t]hese express powers are...taken out of any power included in the general grant of power". Since the C.T.A. contains no such specific provisions concerning pesticides (nor a clause limiting its purview to matters not specifically provided for in the Act) the "general welfare" provision of the C.T.A., s. 410(1), is not limited in this fashion.
23 Section 410(1) C.T.A.
provides that councils may "make by-laws:
(1) To secure peace, order, good
government, health and general welfare in the territory of the municipality,
provided such by-laws are not contrary to the laws of Canada, or of Québec, nor
inconsistent with any special provision of this Act or of the Charter."
In
Nanaimo
(City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, 2000 SCC 13, at
para. 36, this Court quoted with approval the following statement by McLachlin
J. (now Chief Justice) in Shell
Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231, at p.
244:
Recent commentary suggests an emerging consensus that courts must
respect the responsibility of elected municipal bodies to serve the people who
elected them and exercise caution to avoid substituting their views of what is
best for the citizens for those of municipal councils. Barring clear
demonstration that a municipal decision was beyond its powers, courts should not
so hold. In cases where powers are not expressly conferred but may be
implied, courts must be prepared to adopt the "benevolent construction" which
this Court referred to in Greenbaum, and confer the powers by reasonable
implication. Whatever rules of construction are applied, they must not be used
to usurp the legitimate role of municipal bodies as community representatives.
[Emphasis added.]
Suppose, for example, that a municipality passed a by-law prohibiting the use of chemical pesticides on residential lawns. With no additional information, one might well conclude that the purpose of the by-law was to protect persons from health hazards contained in the chemical spray. This inference would be based on empirical beliefs about the harms chemical pesticides can cause and the risks of exposure created by their use on residential lawns. It would also be based on assumptions about the relative value of grass, insects and persons in society and the desirability of possible consequences of the by-law, such as putting people out of work, restricting the free use of property, interfering with the conduct of businesses and the like. These assumptions make it implausible to suppose that the municipal council was trying to promote the spread of plant-destroying insects or to put chemical workers out of work, but plausible to suppose that it was trying to suppress a health hazard.
(Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 53)
Kennedy J. correctly found that the Town Council, "faced with a situation involving health and the environment", "was addressing a need of their community." In this manner, the municipality is attempting to fulfill its role as what the Ontario Court of Appeal has called the "trustee of the environment" (Scarborough v. R.E.F. Homes Ltd. (1979), 9 M.P.L.R. 255, at p. 257).
... in Montréal (City of) v. Arcade Amusements Inc., supra, this Court recognized that discrimination in the municipal law sense was no more permissible between than within classes (at pp. 405-6). Further, the general reasonableness or rationality of the distinction is not at issue: discrimination can only occur where the enabling legislation specifically so provides or where the discrimination is a necessary incident to exercising the power delegated by the province (Montréal (City of) v. Arcade Amusements Inc., supra, at pp. 404-6). [Emphasis added.]
See also Shell, supra, at p. 282; Allard Contractors Ltd. v. Coquitlam (District), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 371, at p. 413.
30 To conclude this section on
statutory authority, I note that reading s. 410(1) to permit the Town to
regulate pesticide use is consistent with principles of international law and
policy. My reasons for the Court in Baker
v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R.
817, at p. 861, observed that "the values reflected in international
human rights law may help inform the contextual approach to statutory
interpretation and judicial review. As stated in Driedger on the Construction
of Statutes, supra, at p. 330:
[T]he legislature is presumed to
respect the values and principles enshrined in international law, both customary
and conventional. These constitute a part of the legal context in which
legislation is enacted and read. In so far as possible, therefore,
interpretations that reflect these values and principles are preferred.
[Emphasis added.]
Canada "advocated inclusion of the precautionary principle" during the Bergen Conference negotiations (D. VanderZwaag, CEPA Issue Elaboration Paper No. 18, CEPA and the Precautionary Principle/Approach (1995), at p. 8). The principle is codified in several items of domestic legislation: see for example the Oceans Act, S.C. 1996, c. 31, Preamble (para. 6); Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33 ("CEPA"), s. 2(1)(a); Endangered Species Act, S.N.S. 1998, c. 11, ss. 2(1)(h) and 11(1).
B. Even if the Town had authority to enact
it, was By-law 270 rendered inoperative
because of a conflict with
federal or provincial legislation?
1. Federal Legislation
34 The appellants argue that ss. 4(1), 4(3) and 6(j) of the Pest Control Products Act ("PCPA"), and s. 45 of the Pest Control Products Regulations allowed them to make use of the particular pesticide products they employed in their business practices. They allege a conflict between these legislative provisions and By-law 270. In Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at p. 187, Dickson J. (later Chief Justice) for the majority of the Court reviewed the "express contradiction test" of conflict between federal and provincial legislation. At p. 191, he explained that "there would seem to be no good reasons to speak of paramountcy and preclusion except where there is actual conflict in operation as where one enactment says `yes' and the other says `no'; `the same citizens are being told to do inconsistent things'; compliance with one is defiance of the other." See also M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961, at paras. 17 and 40; Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121, at p. 151. By-law 270, as a product of provincial enabling legislation, is subject to this test.
2. Provincial Legislation
36Multiple Access also applies to the inquiry into whether there is a conflict between the by-law and provincial legislation, except for cases (unlike this one) in which the relevant provincial legislation specifies a different test. The Multiple Access test, namely "impossibility of dual compliance", see P. W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (loose-leaf ed. 1997), vol 1, at p. 16-13, was foreshadowed for provincial-municipal conflicts in dicta contained in this Court's decision in Arcade Amusements, supra, at p. 404. There, Beetz J. wrote that "otherwise valid provincial statutes which are directly contrary to federal statutes are rendered inoperative by that conflict. Only the same type of conflict with provincial statutes can make by-laws inoperative: Ian M. Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 1971, No. 63.16" (emphasis added).
It is no longer the key to this kind of problem to look at one comprehensive scheme, and then to look at the other comprehensive scheme, and to decide which scheme entirely occupies the field to the exclusion of the other. Instead, the correct course is to look at the precise provisions and the way they operate in the precise case, and ask: Can they coexist in this particular case in their operation? If so, they should be allowed to co-exist, and each should do its own parallel regulation of one aspect of the same activity, or two different aspects of the same activity." [Emphasis added.]
The court summarized the applicable standard as follows: "A true and outright conflict can only be said to arise when one enactment compels what the other forbids." See also Law Society of Upper Canada v. City of Barrie (2000), 46 O.R. (3d) 620 (Sup. Ct.), at pp. 628-30: "Compliance with the provincial Act does not necessitate defiance of the municipal By-law; dual compliance is certainly possible."; Huot v. Ville de Saint-Jérome, J.E. 93-1052 (C.S.), at pp. 19-20: [TRANSLATION] "A finding that a municipal by-law is inconsistent with a provincial statute (or a provincial statute with a federal statute) requires, first, that they both deal with similar subject matters, and second, that obeying one necessarily means disobeying the other."
According to proponents of the pluralist theory, the provincial legislature very definitely did not intend to abolish the municipality's power to regulate; rather, it intended merely to better circumscribe that power, to ensure complementarity with the municipal management scheme.
. . .
The pluralist theory accordingly concedes that the intention is to give priority to provincial statutory and regulatory provisions. However, it does not believe that it can be deduced from this that any complementary municipal provision in relation to planning and development that affects the quality of the environment is automatically invalid.
. . .
A thorough analysis of the provisions cited supra and a review of the environmental policy as a whole as it was apparently intended by the legislature leads to the conclusion that it is indeed the pluralist theory, or at least a pluralist theory, that the legislature seems to have taken as the basis for the statutory scheme.
In this case, there is no barrier to dual
compliance with By-law 270 and the Pesticides
Act, nor any
plausible evidence that the legislature intended to preclude municipal
regulation of pesticide use. The Pesticides Act establishes a permit
and licensing
system for vendors and commercial applicators of pesticides
and thus complements the
federal legislation's focus on the products
themselves. Along with By-law 270, these
laws establish a tri-level
regulatory regime.
- concerns landscaping or extermination activities, such as fumigation, as defined by government regulation, and
- prevents or further mitigates harmful effects on the health of humans or of other living species or damage to the environment or to property.
This revised language indicates more explicitly
that the Pesticides Act
is meant to co-exist with stricter municipal
by-laws of the type at issue in this case. Indeed, the new s. 102, by including
the word "health", echoes the enabling legislation that underpins By-law-270,
namely s. 410(1) C.T.A. Once a Pesticide Management Code is enacted,
municipalities will be able to draw on s. 102 in order to continue their
independent regulation of pesticides. As Duplessis and Hétu, supra,
explain at p. 111: [TRANSLATION] "the Quebec legislature
has again recognized that municipalities have a role to play in pesticide
control while at the same time indicating that it intends to make the municipal
power subordinate to its own regulatory activity."
VI. Disposition
LEBEL J. --
Introduction
The Operational Conflict
46 As its first line of attack against By-law 270 of the Town of Hudson, the appellants raise the issue of an operational conflict with the federal Pest Control Products Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9, and the Pest Control Products Regulations, C.R.C., c.1253. The appellants also assert that the by-law conflicts with the Quebec Pesticides Act, R.S.Q., c. P-9.3. As L'Heureux-Dubé J. points out, the applicable test to determine whether an operational conflict arises is set out in Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCucheon, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 161, at pp. 187 and 189. There must be an actual conflict, in the sense that compliance with one set of rules would require a breach of the other. This principle was recently reexamined and restated by Binnie J. in M & D Farm Ltd. v. Manitoba Agricultural Credit Corp., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 961, at pp. 982-85. The basic test remains the impossibility of dual compliance. From this perspective, the alleged conflict with federal legislation simply does not exist. The federal Act and its regulations merely authorize the importation, manufacturing, sale and distribution of the products in Canada. They do not purport to state where, when and how pesticides could or should be used. They do not grant a blanket authority to pesticides' manufacturers or distributors to spread them on every spot of greenery within Canada. This matter is left to other legislative and regulatory schemes. Nor does a conflict exist with the provincial Pesticides Act, and I agree with L'Heureux-Dubé J.'s analysis on this particular point. The operational conflict argument thus fails.
The Administrative Law Issues
49 A tradition of strong local government has become an important part of the Canadian democratic experience. This level of government usually appears more attuned to the immediate needs and concerns of the citizens. Nevertheless, in the Canadian legal order, as stated on a number of occasions, municipalities remain creatures of provincial legislatures (see Public School Boards' Assn. of Alberta v. Alberta (Attorney General), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 409, 2000 SCC 45, at paras. 33-34; Ontario English Catholic Teachers' Assn. v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 1 S.C.R. 470, 2001 SCC 15, at paras. 29 and 58-59). Municipalities exercise such powers as are granted to them by legislatures. This principle is illustrated by numerous decisions of our Court (see, for example, City of Montréal v. Arcade Amusements Inc., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 368; R. v. Sharma, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 650). They are not endowed with residuary general powers, which would allow them to exercise dormant provincial powers (see I. M. Rogers, The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations (2nd ed. (loose-leaf)), Cum. Supp. to vol. 1, at pp. 358 and 364; J. Hétu, Y. Duplessis and D. Pakenham, Droit Municipal: Principes généraux et contentieux (1998), at p. 651). If a local government body exercises a power, a grant of authority must be found somewhere in the provincial laws. Although such a grant of power must be construed reasonably and generously (Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] 1 S.C.R. 342, 2000 SCC 13), it cannot receive such an interpretation unless it already exists. Interpretation may not supplement the absence of power.
52 In the case of a specific grant of power, its limits must be found in the provision itself. Non-included powers may not be supplemented through the use of the general residuary clauses often found in municipal laws (R. v. Greenbaum, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 674).
53 The case at bar raises a different issue: absent a specific grant of power, does a general welfare provision like s. 410(1) authorize By-law 270? A provision like s. 410(1) must be given some meaning. It reflects the reality that the legislature and its drafters cannot foresee every particular situation. It appears to be sound legislative and administrative policy, under such provisions, to grant local governments a residual authority to deal with the unforeseen or changing circumstances, and to address emerging or changing issues concerning the welfare of the local community living within their territory. Nevertheless, such a provision cannot be construed as an open and unlimited grant of provincial powers. It is not enough that a particular issue has become a pressing concern in the opinion of a local community. This concern must relate to problems that engage the community as a local entity, not a member of the broader polity. It must be closely related to the immediate interests of the community within the territorial limits defined by the legislature in a matter where local governments may usefully intervene. In Shell Canada Products Ltd. v. Vancouver (City), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 231, the Court emphasized the local ambit of such power. It does not allow local governments and communities to exercise powers in questions that lie outside the traditional area of municipal interests, even if municipal powers should be interpreted broadly and generously (see F. Hoehn, Municipalities and Canadian Law: Defining the Authority of Local Governments, (1996), at pp. 17-24).
56 For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed, with costs to the respondent the Town of Hudson.
Appeal dismissed with costs.
Solicitors for the appellants: Fraser Milner Casgrain, Montréal.
Solicitors for the respondent: Bélanger Sauvé, Montréal.
Solicitors for the interveners Federation of Canadian Municipalities, Nature-Action Québec Inc. and World Wildlife Fund Canada: Sierra Legal Defence Fund, Toronto.
Solicitors for the interveners Toronto Environmental Alliance, Sierra Club of Canada, Canadian Environmental Law Association, Parents' Environmental Network, Healthy Lawns -- Healthy People, Pesticide Action Group Kitchener, Working Group on the Health Dangers of the Urban Use of Pesticides, Environmental Action Barrie, Breast Cancer Prevention Coalition, Vaughan Environmental Action Committee and Dr. Merryl Hammond: Canadian Environmental Law Association, Toronto.
Solicitors for the intervener Fédération interdisciplinaire de l'horticulture ornementale du Québec: Ogilvy Renault, Québec.